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Introduction
The equity and constitutionality of Minnesota's public school
financing system for elementary and secondary students has once
again been brought to the judicial forefront. In October of 1988,
eleven percent of Minnesota's school districts,' which enroll ap-
proximately one quarter of Minnesota's public school students,2
filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the current Min-
nesota school financing plan.3 This comes more than eighteen
1. Star Tribune, Oct. 5, 1988, at lB.
2. Star Tribune, Oct. 20, 1988, at 1A.
3. Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954 (Wright Co. Dist. Ct. Minn. filed Oct. 4,
1988). Full listing of Complaint's parties follows:
Sheridan and Dianna Skeen, for themselves and as parents of their mi-
nor children, Sarah Skeen and Christopher Skeen; John and Madeline
Novak, for themselves and as parents of their minor children, Jill No-
vak, Andrew Novak, and Heather Novak; Ronald and Linda Rodgers,
for themselves and as parents of their minor children, Ryan Rodgers
and Brennan Rodgers; James and Sandra Tool, for themselves and as
parents of their minor children, Jenny Tool and Ryan Tool; Vincent
and Joyce Neumann, for themselves and as parents of their minor
children, Matthew Neumann and Meridith Neumann; Albert Lea In-
dependent School District No. 241; Alexandria Independent School
District No. 206; Anoka Hennepin Independent School District No. 11;
Big Lake Independent School District No. 727; Braham Independent
School District No. 3141; Buffalo Independent School District No. 877;
Cambridge-Isanti Independent School District No. 877; Chisago Lakes
Independent School District No. 141; Cold Spring Independent School
District No. 750; Dassel-Cokato Independent School District No. 466;
Delano Independent School District No. 879; Detroit Lakes Independ-
ent School District No. 22; Eden Prairie Independent School District
No. 272; Eden Valley-Watkins Independent School District No. 463;
Elk River Independent School District No. 728; Faribault Independent
School District No. 656; Forest Lake Independent School District No.
831; Glencoe Independent School District No. 422; Hutchinson In-
dependent School District No. 423; Jordan Independent School District
No. 727; Lakeville Independent School District No. 194; LeSueur In-
dependent School District No. 393; Litchfield Independent School Dis-
trict No. 465; Maple Lake Independent School District No. 912;
Monticello Independent School District No. 882; Mora Independent
School District No. 332; New London-Spicer Independent School Dis-
trict No. 345; New Prague Independent School District No. 138; North-
field Independent School District No. 659; Norwood-Young America
Independent School District No. 108; Ogilvie Independent School Dis-
trict No. 333; Osseo Independent School District No. 279; Pine City In-
dependent School District No. 578; Princeton Independent School
District No. 477; Prior Lake Independent School District No. 719;
Rockford Independent School District No. 883; Rosseau Independent
School District No. 682; Rosemount Independent School District No.
196; Rush City Independent School District No. 139; St. Francis In-
dependent School District No. 15; St. Michael-Albertville Independent
1989] FINANCING EDUCATION IN MINNESOTA
years after the only modern constitutional challenge to Minne-
sota's financing scheme,4 and presents the Minnesota courts with a
challenge to interpret the substantive reach of Minnesota's consti-
tutional protection for education and to establish judicial standards
for review of the legislature's educational financing plans.
This article addresses the equity and constitutionality of Min-
nesota's school financing plan. It argues that the Minnesota Con-
stitution establishes a right to equality of educational opportunity
and, therefore, requires the state to maintain a system of financing
substantially free of wealth-based disparity and program inequal-
ity. Part I summarizes the history of both state and federal consti-
tutional challenges to state education financing systems. Part II
discusses the history of school financing in Minnesota and explains
how the current Minnesota school financing system functions.
Part III illustrates the inequity of Minnesota's present financing
system. Part IV concludes that the current Minnesota school fi-
nancing system is unconstitutional. Finally, Part V presents a pro-
posal to eliminate the inequity and unconstitutionality of the
current financing system.
School District No. 885; St. Peter Independent School District No. 508;
Sauk Rapids Independent School District No. 47; Waseca Independent
School District No. 829; Watertown-Mayer Independent School Dis-
trict No. 111; Winona Independent School District No. 861,
Plaintiffs,
V.
State of Minnesota; Ruth E. Randall, in her official capacity as the
Commissioner of Education for the State of Minnesota; and the Min-
nesota State Board of Education,
Defendants.
The school districts suing the State represent middle class districts and not the less
wealthy districts, which are usually found in lawsuits of this type.
There are three specific allegations of the Complaint which need to be high-
lighted. First, while the complaint addresses a number of inequities in the state's
school financing system, its primary contention is that the state's referendum levy
leaves school financing subject to the disparity of district taxable property wealth.
The plaintiffs allege a strong correlation between funding and property wealth, cit-
ing the increased difficulty of a less wealthy property district to pass a referendum
levy and the greater burden these communities face in order to raise equivalent
revenues through referenda.- As a result, plaintiffs point to "less educational oppor-
tunity and lower quality education than students in wealthier school districts in
Minnesota," Complaint at 16, and foresee a lifetime of "relative disadvantage." Id.
Second, the Complaint claims that the funding disparity based on taxable prop-
erty wealth is neither "necessary to achieve any compelling state interest, nor does
it bear a rational relationship to any legitimate state interest." Complaint at 16-17.
Third, the plaintiffs conclude that the funding plan is in violation of the educa-
tion uniformity clause of the Minnesota Constitution and is "not thorough and effi-
cient as required by article XIII section 1 of the constitution." Complaint at 22.
Finally, as education is a "fundamental right of [Minnesota's] citizenship," Com-
plaint at 8, plaintiffs allege that they are denied "equal protection of the law in vio-
lation of the constitution of the State of Minnesota." Complaint at 22.
4. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
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I. History of Constitutional Challenges to State School Financing
Systems
A. Federal Basis of Judicial Intervention in Education
The courts have traditionally been very active in the educa-
tion arena.5 Prior to San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,6 federal and state court decisions, 7 most notably Ser-
rano v. Priest 1,8 followed what appeared to be the Supreme
Court's lead in the area and protected educational rights under the
aegis of the fourteenth amendment.9 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Rodriguez, however, marked a severe blow to reform advo-
5. Percey Burrup, Vern Brimley & Rulon Farfield, Financing Education in a
Climate of Change 242-43 (1988). Most notable is the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which effec-
tively rid public education of the shackles of the "separate but equal" doctrine.
6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Supreme Court's 5-4 decision upheld the constitutionality
of the Texas school financing system against a fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion challenge).
7. See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Milliken
v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill I, 118 N.J. Super.
223, 287 A.2d 187, vacated, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1973); Sweetwater City
Planning Comm'n for the Org. of School Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971),
juris. relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972).
8. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Serrano I was a
landmark case in school financing litigation for several reasons. First, it was the
first successful constitutional challenge to school financing disparities, pursuing its
claim on the federal constitution's fourteenth amendment equal protection provi-
sion. Second, it judicially established principles popularized by John Coones, Wil-
liam Clunes III and Stephen Sugarman. In their book Private Wealth and Public
Education (1971), the authors argue that the quality of education within a state
should not be a function of wealth, race or geography, and that equal tax effort
should generate substantially equal revenues in all school districts. This concept
has come to be known as the "Serrano Principle." John Coones, William Clunes
III, & Stephen Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education 5 (1971). Third,
Serrano I was concerned with differences in ability to pay, not necessarily in the
size of the tax differences. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 613. Fourth and finally, Serrano I held education to be a fundamental
right requiring any significant spending disparity to withstand "strict scrutiny." Id.
at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-19.
9. Initially, the federal judiciary seemed poised to extend its involvement to
questions of equality of educational opportunity under the federal constitution's
equal protection guarantee. See Annette B. Johnson, State Court Intervention in
School Finance Reform, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 325, 331-32 (1979):
Prior to Rodriguez [San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973)], school finance reformers had observed the willingness
of the Warren Court to extend the scope of equal protection to classifi-
cations based on wealth in prisoners' rights and voting cases. There
was also recognition of constitutionally protected fundamental rights
that were not explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. The nation as
a whole had observed the particular protection afforded education by
the federal courts. Since the decision of Brown v. Board of Education
in 1954, there had been frequent judicial intervention in local decisions
with the Court accepting jurisdiction to administer reforms directly,
ordering redistribution of teachers as well as pupils, monitoring
[Vol. 8:229
1989] FINANCING EDUCATION IN MINNESOTA
cates. In Rodriguez, the Court upheld a clearly inequitable
education financing systeml0 and foreclosed the use of the federal
constitution's equal protection provision in school finance
litigation."
The decision, however, did not preclude similar litigation
under state constitutional protections and has merely shifted the
question back to the state courts. The Rodriguez opinion provided
numerous avenues for advocates of school finance reform in state
courts. First, the Court's explanation that education was not con-
sidered fundamental because it was not "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution"'12 has, by negative implication,
been cited by courts as suggesting that state constitutions which
contain explicit protections for education should consider educa-
tion to be a fundamental right.13 Second, the Court's suggestion
that additional evidence of actual injury and a clearer cause and
student-teacher ratios with respect to race and teacher experience, and
enjoining school closings
Id. (citation omitted).
10. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1973) (dis-
trict court's analysis of program inequality); id. at 17 ("State candidly admits that
'no one familiar with the Texas system would contend that it has yet achieved
perfection' "); id. at 55-56 (Supreme Court's implicit acknowledgment of the ine-
qualities of the financing system). The Supreme Court was reacting to a system
which was structured in the following way:
The Texas system was a modified foundation program that required
each district to contribute a percentage of the minimum guarantee,
based on a formula that took into account revenue raising ability of
the district. Because of disparities in the value of district property,
however, the Edgewood school district, taxing itself at a rate of $1.05
per $100 of assessed property, could raise only $26 per pupil above its
contribution to the local fund assignment for total available state and
local educational expenditure of $248 per pupil. This amount was sup-
plemented by $108 in federal funds for a total per pupil expenditure of
$248 per pupil. This amount was supplemented by $108 in federal
funds for a total per pupil expenditure of $356. By contrast, the
Alamo Heights district, taxing itself at the rate of .85 per $100 of valu-
ation, yielded $333 per pupil over and above its contribution to the
Foundation Program, leaving it with $558 per pupil after the state sup-
port from the Foundation Program was added. It also received $36 per
pupil from federal sources for a total expenditure of $594 per pupil.
Johnson, supra note 9, at 333 n.26.
11. The Court's majority held that there was no federal constitutionally guaran-
teed right to education. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. The Court rejected extending
"strict scrutiny" constitutional protection to pupils or taxpayers on the basis of
wealth discrimination. Id. at 19-29. The Court also rejected the argument based on
education's nexus to full and intelligent exercise of first amendment rights. Id. at
35.
12. Id. at 33-34.
13. The Court's language has been referred to by advocates of finance reform
and by later state court decisions as the "Rodriguez test" of fundamentality. See,
e.g., Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977);
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effect relationship between education expenditures and student
achievements will lead to greater potential success for reform ad-
vocates14 has led many to believe that further documentation is
the key to successfully establishing state constitutional protections
for education funding inequalities.15 Third, the Court was careful
to premise its restraint on the control state and local districts have
traditionally exerted over school financing.16 Fourth, the Court
clearly enunciated the vital importance of education in a free,
democratic society and the apparent need for "reform in tax sys-
tems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the
local property tax."17 The latter two factors emphasize the nar-
rowness of the Court's holding on the federal constitutional pro-
tections, keeping open such challenges under state constitutional
protections. The Court's delivery of the issue of school financing
to state courts has been further reinforced by its repeated refusal
to hear subsequent education cases.' 8
B. State Basis of Judicial Intervention in Education
Financing
The state court rulings immediately following Rodriguez
were predictably negative for school financing reform advocates. 19
Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Washakie Co. School Dist.
No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1981).
A number of states have considered and rejected the notion that education is a
fundamental right under their respective state constitutions' education provisions.
See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983);
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1983); Board of Educ.,
Levittown, v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982); Mc-
Daniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58
Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v.
State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Thompson v. Engeking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d
635 (1975); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
14. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-27 (discussing the necessary conditions required
for greater protection, e.g., statistical support of the disproportionate burden, id. at
22-23, a showing of absolute deprivation, id. at 20, a definable category of "poor"
people adversely affected, id. at 25, and comparative wealth discrimination, id. at
27).
15. See, e.g., Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for. Urban Public Schools:
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 830-35 nn.225-62 (1985).
16. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-41.
17. Id. at 29-30.
18. Burrup, Brimley & Farfield, supra note 5, at 253.
19. Note, Debelopments in State Constitutions, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324, 1459-62
(1982):
Judicial invalidation of legislation must be justified by a belief that the
legislature has infringed upon an important personal right. But state
judges find it difficult to label rights "fundamental" without simulta-
neously maintaining that such rights should be generally applicable
throughout the United States. Therefore, when redressing constitu-
tional wrongs state courts prefer to speak in the language of the fed-
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Many state courts interpreted their state constitutions' equal pro-
tection provisions as co-extensive with the federal constitution,
and thus summarily rejected the state equal protection chal-
lenges. 20 This was not surprising given state courts' overwhelming
tendencies in privacy and education cases to find state-specific fac-
tors-state constitutional text or history-to be insufficient au-
thority for development of a state fundamental right.2 ' The
Warren and early Burger Courts' expansion of federal constitu-
tional protections reinforced the tendency of state courts to rely on
federal law and federal courts for their interpretation of state con-
stitutional protections.22 It is noteworthy, however, that even in
the wake of Rodriguez, state courts remained adamant about their
right and authority under their state constitutions to review the
school financing plans of their respective legislatures.23
In the 1970s, the state courts accepted the Burger Court's
challenge to develop their own body of state freedoms, asserting
that state constitutional protections for education could extend be-
yond the federal constitutional protections. 24 Since Rodriguez,
twenty-four state courts have considered the constitutionality of
their school finance systems and have found them unconstitu-
tional.25 Most noteworthy is the recent Texas Supreme Court's
eral Constitution. Influencing the development of national norms thus
becomes the central concern of state constitutional interpretation; reli-
ance on state grounds is accordingly seen as a last resort.
Id. (citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollings, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) (Arizona
Supreme Court found education to be a fundamental right but applied a rational
basis test to evaluate the legislative financing plan and thus upheld the constitu-
tionality of the state's plan); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711
(1973) (vacated earlier decision which had declared the state's school financing sys-
tem unconstitutional); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685,
530 P.2d 178 (1974) (system upheld as a valid exercise of legislative power); Thomp-
son v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) (upheld constitutionality of
school financing which relied heavily upon local property taxes and created une-
qual expenditures per pupil; education was not found to be a fundamental right);
Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976) (inequality of financing system due to
reliance on property taxes justified by local control and the availability of alterna-
tive financing).
21. See Note, supra note 19, at 1459-61.
22. Id. at 1460; see also Johnson, supra note 9.
23. See Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 2d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear,
84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Serrano v.
Priest II, 18 Cal. 2d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976); Seattle School Dist.
No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
25. Dupre v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Ser-
rano v. Priest I, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Rose v. Coun-
cil for Better Educ., No. 88-SC-804-T6 (Ky. June 8, 1989) (Westlaw, state case law
database); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
1989]
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ruling that *the state's method of school financing is unconstitu-
tional.26 Though addressing many of the same ills and inequities
the Rodriguez Court found unprotected under the federal constitu-
tion, the Texas court in a 9-0 decision struck down the financing
system of the nation's second largest school system as violative of
the state's constitutional requirement for an "efficient" educa-
tional system.27 Besides the Minnesota challenge, there are five
other states with similar cases pending. Four of the states are
hearing challenges for the first time.28 Reform through state court
litigation has been established as a viable avenue for change.
This development has not been uniform.29 Two questions
have been fundamental to state court resolution of each decision.
First, whether the state's funding formula satisfies the state consti-
tution's education provision. Second, whether the state's funding
formula violates the state's constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection, particularly given the greater emphasis accorded education
by the state's explicit education provisions. An affirmative answer
to either inquiry typically subjects the state financing plan to strict
scrutiny.30
C. State Constitution Education Provision Argument
The states created the public school systems and have ple-
nary power over them.31 Indeed, the duty to educate is "para-
mount" to the state's function.32 Unlike the federal constitution,
the constitutions of forty-eight of the fifty states provide explicit
Robinson v. Cahill II, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978);
Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Washakie County School
Dist. No. 1 v. Huschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980);
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Horton v. Mes-
kill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
26. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
27. Id.
28. Alaska, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennesee (initial hearings) and New Jersey
(rehearing). Susan Tifft, The Big Shift in School Finance, Time, Oct. 16, 1989, at 48.
29. One commentary describes it as: "a series of unrelated ad hoc decisions
which reflect the bias of the state's population toward reform rather than a uni-
form trend based on objective legal reasoning or criteria." Johnson, supra note 9,
at 337.
30. Id.
31. Ratner, supra note 15, at 814-15.
32. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) ("Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments." (quoting Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); see also, Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d 476,
511, 585 P.2d 71, 90 (1979) (" 'Paramount' is not a mere synonym for 'important.'
Rather, it means superior in rank, above all others, chief, preeminent, supreme,
and in fact dominant.").
(Vol. 8:229
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protection for education. 33  The education provisions vary
greatly,34 but each education clause imposes upon the state a con-
stitutional duty to provide the level of education which its consti-
tution dictates, and to do so by meeting the obligation itself or by
delegating the duty to local districts, subject to legislative direction
and supervision.3 5 While states clearly have an explicit duty to
provide for education, what level of education is required is un-
clear. Implicit in this inquiry is what "qualitative standard"3 6 is
appropriate to evaluate the legislature's performance of its duty to
educate.
In Robinson v. Cahill 11,3 7 Seattle School District No. 1 v.
State of Washington 3s and Edgewood Independent School District
v. Kirby, 39 three state supreme courts found their states' school fi-
nancing plans to be incongruous with their own constitutions' edu-
cation provisions. In Robinson II, the New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded its state school financing system violated the education
clause of the New Jersey Constitution which required a "thorough
33. See Alaska Const. art. VII, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 1; Ark. Const. art.
XIV, § 1; Cal. Const. art. IX, § 1; Colo. Const. art. IX, § 2; Conn. Const. art. VIII, § 1;
Del. Const. art. X, § 1; Fla. Const. art. IX, § 1; Ga. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Haw. Const.
art. X, § 1; Idaho Const. art. IX, § 1; 111. Const. art. X, § 1; Ind. Const. art. VIII, § 1;
Iowa Const. art. IX, § 2; Kan. Const. art. VI, § 1; Ky. Const. art. VI, § 183; La. Const.
art. VIII, § 1; Me. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Md. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Mass. Const. pt. 2,
ch. 5, § 2; Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2; Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1; Mo. Const. art. IX,
§ 1(a); Mont. Const. art. X, § 1; Neb. Const. art. VII, § 1; Nev. Const. art. XI, § 2;
N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. Const. art. XII, § 1; N.Y.
Const. art. XI, § 1; N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2; N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Ohio Const.
art. VI, § 3; Okla. Const. art. XIII, § 1; Or. Const. art. VIII, § 3; Pa. Const. art. III,
§ 14; R.I. Const. art. XII, § 1; S.C. Const. art. XI, § 3; S.D. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Tenn.
Const. art. XI, § 12; Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1; Utah Const. art. X, § 1; Vt. Const. ch.
2, § 68; Va. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Wash. Const. art. IX, §§ 1, 2; W. Va. Const. art. XII,
§ 1; Wis. Const. art. X, § 3; Wyo. Const. art. VII, § 1.
34. For example, the Connecticut Constitution is general: "There shall always
be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state." Conn. Const. art. III,
§ 1. The Washington Constitution, however, is very specific: "[I]t is the paramount
duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders," Wash. Const. art. IX, § 1, and it is the duty of the legislature to
"provide for a general and uniform system of public schools." Id. at art. IX, § 2.
35. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill II, 62 N.J. 473, 513, 303 A.2d 273, 293-97 (1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1975):
If the State chooses to assign its obligation [to educate] under the 1975
amendment to local government, the State must do so by a plan which
will fulfill the State's continuing obligation. To that end the State
must define in some discernible way the educational obligation and
must compel the local school districts to raise the money necessary to
provide that opportunity.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Ratner, supra note 15, at 814-15 n.139.
36. See infra notes 123-137 and accompanying text.
37. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
38. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
39. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
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and efficient system of free public schools."40 The court has subse-
quently construed the "thorough and efficient" clause to require
equal educational opportunity.41 In striking the financing system,
the court cited the state's reliance upon inherently unequal local
taxation. 42 In Seattle School District No. 1, the Washington
Supreme Court rejected the state's school financing system be-
cause it relied upon discretionary local districts' levies to raise rev-
enues. 43 The court found the current system violated the
Washington Constitution's requirement of "regular and dependa-
ble sources" of funds for public education.44
In Edgewood, the Texas Supreme Court unequivocally struck
the entire framework of the state's school financing plan due to
the system's reliance upon unequal taxable property wealth.4s Re-
lying upon the original intent of the state constitutional parame-
ters in mandatory and "efficient" school systems, the court
interpreted the education clause to require equality of educational
opportunity.46
40. Robinson v. Cahill II, 62 N.J. 473, 508, 303 A.2d 273, 291 (1978)(quoting N.J.
Const. art IV, § 7, 6). The court defined "thorough and efficient" as requiring the
state to provide "[the] educational opportunity which is needed in the contempo-
rary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor
market." Id.
41. Robinson v. Cahill V, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975), reprinted in corrected
form in 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
42. Id. ("[O]ne difficulty with the design for local fiscal responsibility is that the
tax base to which the school districts are remitted is already overloaded, particu-
larly in the major cities, by the other demands for local service."); see also infra
notes 161-179 and accompanying text.
43. Seattle School Dist No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 524, 585 P.2d 71, 98 (A failure by
voters to approve excess levies in their districts left 40% of students within the
state in need of more revenue.).
44. The Washington Supreme Court interpreted article IX, section 1 of the
Washington Constitution, which provides that "[iut is the paramount duty of the
state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders," as requiring "regular and dependable sources" of sufficient funds. The
court stated:
[Tihe levy system's instability is demonstrated by the special excess
levy's dependence upon the assessed valuation of taxable real prop-
erty, within a district. Some districts have substantially higher real
property valuations than others thus making it easier for them to raise
funds. Such variations provide neither a dependable nor regular
source of revenue for meeting the state's obligation.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 528, 585 P.2d at 98-99.
45. 777 S.W.2d 391 397 (Tex. 1989).
46. Id. at 396-97.
In addition to specific comments in the constitutional debates, the
structure of school finance at the time indicates that such gross dispar-
ities were not contemplated. Apart from cities, there was no district
structure for schools nor any authority to tax locally for school pur-
poses under the constitution of 1876. The 1876 Constitution provided a
structure whereby the burdens of school taxation fell equally and uni-
formly across the state, and each student in the state was entitled to
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Other state courts have not interpreted their constitutions'
education provisions so expansively.47 The vague constitutional
language of most education clauses have been interpreted as re-
quiring merely an "adequate" or "minimal" or "minimally ade-
quate" education.48 Other state courts have emphasized that
school financing is a legislative function and have granted defer-
ence to their state legislatures' financing plans.49 Finally, some
state courts have interpreted their state education clauses as only
mandating that school financing not be left to the complete discre-
tion of local districts.50
These courts have been criticized for failing to define a mini-
mum standard for education financing or to provide constitutional
parameters within which their state legislatures must create their
exactly the same distribution of funds. The state's school fund was ini-
tially apportioned strictly on a per capita basis. We conclude that, in
mandating "efficiency," the constitutional framers and ratifiers did not
intend a system with such vast disparities as now exist.... The pres-
ent system... provides not for a diffusion that is general, but for one
that is limited and unbalanced. The resultant inequalities are thus di-
rectly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency.
Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
47. In fact, most legislative financing plans have been upheld, See Danson v.
Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 424-25, 399 A.2d 360, 365 (1979) ("thorough and efficient" educa-
tion clause required an adequate or minimum education); Board of Educ. v. Walter,
58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 382, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825-26 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1015
(1980) ("thorough and efficient" clause established a minimum standard); Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018-19 (Colo. 1982) ("thorough and uni-
form" clause is "not a mandate for absolute equality in educational services or ex-
penditures" but rather a legislative requirement to "provide to each school age
child the opportunity to receive a free education, and to establish guidelines for a
thorough and uniform system of public schools"); Board of Educ., Levittown v. Ny-
quist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 47, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 652 (1982) (constitu-
tional provision for "a system of free common schools" contains no reference to any
requirement that the education to be made available be equal or substantially
equivalent in every district); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 27, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (1976)
("system of common schools" requirement fulfilled "if the state requires and pro-
vides for a minimum of educational opportunities"); Thompson v. Engelking, 96
Idaho 793, 810, 537 P.2d 635, 652 (1975) ("general, uniform and thorough system of
public, free common school" did not require equal educational expenditures for
equality discussion in constitutional debates); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90,
515 P.2d 590, 592 (1973) ("general and uniform" clause met by a system which was
free and available to all persons aged six to twenty-one, and open for a minimum of
six months per year); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 639, 648, 285 S.E.2d 156, 162,
168 (1981) (constitutional provisions stating that a "primary obligation of the state
of Georgia" (art. VIII, § 1, para. 1 (1976)) to provide "an adequate education for the
citizens" (art. VIII, § 7, para. 1 (1976)) satisfied despite the court's finding that "seri-
ous disparities in educational opportunities exist .... ").
48. See supra note 47 (regarding state court decisions of Arizona, Idaho, Mary-
land, New York, Ohio, and Oregon).
49. See supra note 47 (regarding state court decision of Georgia).
50. See supra note 47 (regarding state court decisions of Colorado and
Pennsylvania).
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financing plans.51 Low educational requirements create a nebu-
lous standard and ensure continued deference to legislative deci-
sions. In addition, these courts have been challenged for their
inconsistent use of the minimum standard: both denying the cost-
quality relationship (between expenditures and quality of educa-
tional opportunity) and holding local fiscal control to be a rational
basis for the differences.52
State court decisions interpreting education clauses illustrate
the broad discretion state courts have in construing the constitu-
tional parameters for education. The decisions reflect the state
courts' attitudes towards legislative discretion, the "proclivity for
judicial activism,"5 3 and the strength of each individual state's
view of education.54 State courts interpreting education provisions
have refused to simply adopt the direction of other state courts.
D. State Equal Protection Argument
Each state constitution contains an explicit or implicit equal
protection provision similar to the federal constitution guarantee,55
and, unlike the federal constitution, most state constitutions also
51. The initial objection to this practice was voiced by Justice Marshall in his
dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973):
Neither the majority nor appellants inform us how judicially manage-
able standards are to be derived for determining how much education
is "enough" to excuse constitutional discrimination. One would think
that the majority would heed its own fervent affirmation of judicial
self-restraint before undertaking the complex task of determining at
large what level of education is constitutionally sufficient .... If, as
the majority stresses, such authorities are uncertain as to the impact of
various levels of funding on educational quality, I fail to see where it
finds the expertise to divine that the particular levels of funding pro-
vided by the program assure an adequate educational opportunity-
much less an education substantially equivalent in quality to that
which a higher level of functioning might provide.
Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. John E. McDermott & Stephen P. Klein, The Cost-Quality Debate in School
Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 415,
426 (1973). McDermott and Klein noted the double standard of Justice Powell's
reasoning in Rodriguez, which on one hand refuses to decide the cost-quality issue,
but on the other hand employs it to justify the basis for the inequity, stating:
If local control means all that Justice Powell says it does, then a rela-
tionship between cost and quality must exist. Local control implies
control over something that has meaningful content. If there is not re-
lationship between cost and quality, then local control has no meaning
and expenditure inequalities which use local control for their justifica-
tion can have no rational basis. For the system to be "rational" (at
least if local control is the rational basis offered), courts must go be-
yond an adequate definition of equality.
Id. at 422.
53. Johnson, supra note 9, at 337.
54. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
55. Ratner, supra note 15, at 845 n.323.
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have an explicit education clause. 56 State courts are empowered to
construe their state equal protection provisions independently of
the United 'States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
equal protection provision. State equal protection clauses are in-
creasingly the basis for state court rulings.57 The Connecticut
Supreme Court observed, "[i]n the area of fundamental civil liber-
ties-which includes all protections of the declaration of rights in
article first of the Connecticut Constitution-[the state supreme
court] sit[s] as the court of last resort, subject only to the qualifica-
tions that [its] interpretations may not restrict guarantees accorded
the national citizenry under the federal charter."5 8  Though many
courts have declined the challenge expressed by the Connecticut
Supreme Court, critics contend that it becomes all the more im-
portant under the Burger and now Rehnquist Courts for state
courts to protect their state constitutional rights, for the Supreme
Court's retraction of federal remedies in reliance on state remedies
"constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach."59
In assessing state constitutional equal protection provisions
affecting school financing, state courts have applied the traditional
two-tiered equal protection analysis used by the United States
Supreme Court.60 Thus, in order for the reviewing court to apply
strict judicial scrutiny, there must be either discrimination involv-
ing a suspect class or infringement of a fundamental right.
Though the United States Supreme Court has not held that educa-
tion disparately impacts a suspect class or reaches the level of a
fundamental right under the federal constitution's equal protec-
tion clause, state courts have found education to be a fundamental
right under their respective state equal protection clauses.61 State
courts have focused on the equal protection guarantees of the state
constitutions interpreted in conjunction with explicit education
56. See supra note 33.
57. See, e.g., Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 457-64 (Alaska 1980) (sustained
state statute awarding state funds to residents in proportion to length of state resi-
dency against both state and federal equal protection challenges), rev'd as to federal
equal protection issue, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932-33,
424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating various aspects of state's medical
malpractice recovery statute as violating state equal protection); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources, 63 Or. App. 41, 58-62, 663
P.2d 1247, 1258-61 (1983) (invalidating state medical assistance for abortions under
state equal protection).
58. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 641, 376 A.2d 359, 371 (1977).
59. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 503 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest I, 5 Cal. 2d 584, 597-601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250-53, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601, 610-13 (1971).
61. See Appendix A-2.
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provisions.62 In determining whether education is a fundmental
right, however, courts have had difficulty developing objective and
consistent criteria for assessing "fundmentality." Three primary
analyses of fundmentality have been applied by state courts: the
Rodriguez "test,"63 education's "overall importance to the state,"64
and education's "nexus to other constitutional rights."6 5
Under a strict application of the Rodriguez test, most state
courts would find education to be a fundamental right, for nearly
every state's constitution explicitly protects education.66 Although
some courts have declined to adopt this test of fundamentality,67
four state courts have embraced it.68
Analysis of education's "overall importance to the state" has
been adopted by a few state courts. For example, the courts in
Horton v. Meskill69 and Serrano v. Priest I O both employed this
analysis to find education to be a fundamental right. The Horton
court focused on four factors to determine the importance of edu-
62. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
63. San Antonio Indep. School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973):
[T]he key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to
be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of educa-
tion as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.
Rather the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to educa-
tion explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution
Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217
n.15 (1982) (Court grants fundamentality to a right which is protected in the
Constitution).
64. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 33.
67. Id. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 672, 458
A.2d 758, 799 (1983) (Cole, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority relies on several cases, a
careful analysis of which demonstrates that it has overreacted to theoretical pos-
sibilities suggested by other courts."). Courts rejecting this test of fundamentality
point out that state constitutions, unlike the federal constitution, are not restricted
to protections for activities of fundamental import and worthy of strict scrutiny re-
view. Many state constitutions explicitly enumerate rights which are clearly not
fundamental. This objection has been viewed by many as more technical than sub-
stantive. Other objections to the Rodriguez test of fundamentality are that it is
"overly simplistic," that there are other vital public interests such as fire protec-
tion, personal security, health care, and welfare subsidies which are equally impor-
tant, and that it would leave all local fiscal schemes subject to review under equal
protection analysis. See, e.g., Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 19, 554 P.2d 139, 144 (1976)
(liquor by the drink); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017
(Colo. 1983) (mining and irrigation); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368,
375, 390 N.E.2d 813, 818 (1979) (worker's compensation); Board of Educ., Levittown
v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 43 n.5, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 n.5, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650 n.5
(1982) (superintendence and repair of canals).
68. See supra note 13.
69. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
70. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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cation to the state: (1) the explicit protection of education in the
state constitution; (2) the lengthy history of the state's interest in
education; (3) the fact that education is regulated by state statute;
and (4) the compulsory nature of education.71 The Serrano I court
found education to be a fundamental right by examining several
other factors: (1) the large number of persons affected by educa-
tion; (2) the extended period of time it directly affects residents;
(3) the significance of its effect on its residents; (4) its critical im-
portance to economic prosperity and social stability; and (5) the
fact that education is mandatory.72 In addition, the United States
Supreme Court's classic recitation of the importance of education
in Brown v. Board of Education strongly supports the conclusion
that education is a fundamental right:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our own
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is a principle instrument in awakening the child[ren]
to cultural values, in preparing [them] for later professional
training, and in helping [them] adjust normally to [their] envi-
ronment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child[ren] may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if [they are] denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
available to all on equal terms.73
Analysis of education's "nexus to other constitutional rights"
has been used to supplement state court findings of fundamental-
ity. It has been argued that education should be regarded as a fun-
damental right implicitly protected by state constitutions because
it is a prerequisite to the meaningful discharge of first amendment
rights and the right to vote. The Serrano I court employed this
reasoning as a major factor in holding that education is a funda-
mental right, stating:
The analogy between education and voting is . . . direct: both
are crucial to participation in, and functioning of, a democracy.
Voting has been regarded as a fundamental right because it is
"preservative of other basic civil and political rights."... At a
71. Horton, 172 Conn. at 647-48, 376 A.2d at 374.
72. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-19.
73. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). While acknowledging the
vital importance of education, other courts have declined to conclude that education
is a fundamental right. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, for ex-
ample, typifies the reasoning of most courts rejecting this basis of finding education
to be a fundamental right. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md.
597, 648, 458 A.2d 758, 786 (1983).
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minimum, education makes more meaningful the casting of a
ballot. More significantly, it is likely to provide the under-
standing of, and the interest in, public issues which are the
spur to involvement in other civic and political activities.74
While there is ample precedent for state courts to follow in formu-
lating equitable school financing plans, the decision ultimately
rests upon the language of the state's constitution.
The crucial step in state equal protection analysis of educa-
tion once inequities have been found is the determination of the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the challenged financing
system. State courts which have found education to be a funda-
mental right have typically applied strict scrutiny.75 To overcome
its burden of proof under strict scrutiny, the state must show that
the inequities of the challenged financing plan are necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest. If, however, education is not
determined to be a fundamental right, then the courts apply the
traditional rational basis test.76 To withstand this test, the state is
merely required to show that the inequities of the financing plan
are rationally related to a valid state interest. Courts have typi-
cally been very deferential to the legislature under this lower
standard.77
E. State's Defenses to Judicial Review: Local Control
Under either an education clause78 or an equal protection ar-
gument,79 the state is compelled to justify any inequity in school
financing when challenged. The inequities typically addressed in
school financing litigation stem from the state system's reliance on
local property taxation. Districts which have higher property
value naturally benefit from the property tax system. The stan-
dard defense to property-reliant school financing plans is local con-
trol.80 Without this monetary input, the argument goes, there
74. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
75. See Appendix A-2. But see Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 1414
(1976) (education held to be a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny, but state
was able to meet its burden).
76. See generally Note, supra note 19.
77. An additional argument has been made for reviewing the financing plan
under the Supreme Court's intermediate standard. Id. Intermediate review would
require the state to demonstrate that the financing plan is substantially related to
an important governmental interest. Id
78. See supra notes 31-54 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
80. The United States Supreme Court pronounced the importance of local con-
trol in public education in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 617, 641-42 (1974) ("No sin-
gle tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public school and to quality of
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exists no means for localities to shape their schools.
The reality is that only those districts wealthy enough to ex-
ceed the state's minimum standards have the choice to increase ed-
ucational offerings.8 1 The hardship thus falls upon the less
wealthy districts which have no additional revenues. This "sad
paradox" for these districts has led reform advocates to label local
control the "single most important obstacle to education finance
reform today."8 2 These critics argue that there is an underlying
misconception that local levies are the only way to exert control of
a district's schools.83
Additionally, the recent push for "radical restructuring of
schools and [the] creation of national performance goals" is inappo-
site with the principle of local control. s4 One observer noted that
"the once sacred principle of local control is rapidly going the way
of McGuffey's Reader."8 5
II. Minnesota's School Financing System
A. Minnesota's Recent History of School Financing (1972 -
1987)
Since 1863, the state of Minnesota has involved itself in public
school financing.8 6 In providing public school financing, Minnesota
has struggled over financing equality and, less directly, program
equity.
For many years the state assistance was low and local dis-
tricts provided most of the revenue.8 7 Although state support in-
the educational process."). Board of Education, Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27,
439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), argues that the extent to which a local com-
munity levies above the minimum established by the state is a direct reflection of
the implementation of the desires of the local taxpayers. Id. at 45, 439 N.E.2d at
367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. Others argue with the Rodriguez majority that local con-
trol is advantageous, for it allows each local district "to tailor [its] program to local
needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation,
and a healthy competition for educational excellence." San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973).
81. See infra notes 157-179 and accompanying text.
82. Note, A "Uniform" Education Reform of Local Property Tax School Fi-
nance Systems Through State Constitutions, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 565, 591 (1979) (quot-
ing Betsy Levin, Alternatives to the Present Systems of School Finance: Their
Problems and Prospects, 61 Geo. L.J. 879, 902 (1973)).
83. Id.; see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50, ("Equally important [to local control
over financing], however, is the opportunity it offers for participation in the deci-
sion-making process that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent.").
84. Tifft, supra note 28, at 48.
85. Id.
86. See Minnesota Dep't Educ., The ABC's of Minnesota School Finance: Pay-
ing for the Public Schools in 1987-88 and 1988-89, at 4 (1987).
87. See Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota, High School Edu-
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creased to forty percent by 1960, local property taxes continued to
fund most of the local districts.88 The reliance on local property
taxes led to considerable funding inequity because property-poor
districts had fewer resources to tax than property-wealthy dis-
tricts.8 9 In 1957, the legislature created a foundation aid program
which, through both local and state tax dollars, established a guar-
anteed level of funding per "pupil unit."90  The guaranteed
formula allowance was, however, "well below" the median spend-
ing of most districts, requiring that additional revenues be drawn
from local property taxes.91 This reliance on local property taxes
revived the initial inequities.
This system was successfully challenged in Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield.92 Decided after Serrano v. Priest 193 and before Rodri-
guez, Van Dusartz identified the wealth-based disparities inherent
in Minnesota's school financing system. In holding Minnesota's
school financing system unconstitutional under the federal equal
protection guarantee, the Van Dusartz court adopted the reason-
ing of the Serrano I Court.94 Although its essential underpinnings
were later overruled by Rodriguez, the Van Dusartz decision
firmly established the need for school finance reform in Minnesota
and persuasively discussed the need for a judicially manageable
and legislatively understood9 5 standard of educational opportunity
based on fiscal neutrality.96 Fiscal neutrality attempts to "neutral-
ize" wealth-based disparities in funding by prohibiting any financ-
ing plan which results in a correlation between district wealth and
cation 34 (1988) [hereinafter High School Education] ("From 1900 through 1930,
state aids provided only about 20 percent of revenues.").
88. Id.; see also Legislative Commission on Public Education, Equalization
Trends in Minnesota Education Finance, 1972 Through 1987, at 11 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Legislative Trends].
89. High School Education, supra note 87, at 34-35; see infra notes 157-79 and
accompanying text.
90. High School Education, supra note 87, at 35 n.5 (defining "pupil units"):
Pupil units are determined by applying weights to districts' average
daily membership (ADM). Currently, each kindergarten ADM counts
as 0.5 pupil units; each pre-kindergarten, handicapped kindergarten,
and elementary ADM counts as 1.0 pupil unit; and each secondary
ADM counts as 1.35. Thus, districts receive more funding for secon-
dary students than elementary students.
Id.
91. Legislative Trends, supra note 88, at 11.
92. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
93. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
94. 334 F. Supp. at 877.
95. These self-explanatory terms are important in that they reinforce the no-
tion that the adopted standard of educational opportunity must fulfill the practical
purpose of being implemented and reviewable by both the legislature and the judi-
cary, respectively.
96. 334 F. Supp. at 872-73.
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district revenue.97
In 1971, the Minnesota state legislature attempted to correct
the unsatisfactory financing situation.9 8 There were two major
changes in the 1971 plan. First, the foundation aid formula allow-
ance was raised closer to the actual operating expenditures, while
local property levies were limited. Second, the primary source of
education funding was shifted from local property taxes to state
taxes.a9
The "Minnesota Miracle," as this plan became known,10 0 was
short lived as financial inequities increased throughout the 1970s.
While attempting to equalize foundation allowances through a
"catch up" provision to low-spending districts, the state recognized
the need for "disequalization funds" to compensate for factors
which increased costs in selected districts.'0 1 Increased funding
was thus awarded for concentrations of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) pupil units,1 0 2 and "sparsity aid" was
granted to correct for hardships caused by size and location of a
district.10 3
In 1983-84, the state overhauled its overly complex, and in
many respects, outdated formula by replacing it with a five-tiered
foundation-aid program.10 4 This program attempted to offset cost
factors by adding a "training and experience" allowance based on
the level of education and years of experience of each district's
teachers.O5 That became equally unwieldy and was replaced by
Minnesota's current school financing plan, the General Education
Aid Program.lo0
After 1971, districts were granted an escape clause: the refer-
endum levy. A district could levy any additional amount approved
by its voters in a referendum election, with the proceeds available
to the levying district for any general operating expenses. The use
of this levy has become increasingly important to school districts,
as illustrated below.107
97. See infra notes 136-144 and accompanying text. For application of fiscal
neutrality, see infra notes 142-169 and accompanying text.
98. Legislative Trends, supra note 88, at 12; High School Education, supra note
87, at 35.
99. Legislative Trends, supra note 88, at 12-13.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 14-15.
102. Id. at 14; see infra note 113.
103. Legislative Trends, supra note 88, at 15; see infra note 111.
104. Legislative Trends, supra note 88 at 17.
105. Id.; see iinfra note 112.
106. Minn. Stat. § 124A (1988).
107. Minnesota House Ways and Means Staff on Government Finance Issues,




TRENDS IN USE OF REFERENDA LEVIES
Percent of
Foundation
Total State Total plus
School Number of Referenda Referenda Referendum
Year Districts Levies Levy Per WADM Revenue
1972-73 1 $ 25,395 $ .02 0 %
1978-79 74 7,067,813 7.50 0.6
1981-82 131 43,943,937 52.24 3.2
1983-84 185 68,854,632 84.48 4.3
1984-85 188 69,225,297 85.97 4.2
1985-86 198 79,719,756 99.61 4.5
1986-87 217 95,019,482 118.95 5.0
B. Minnesota's Current School Financing System
Minnesota's current school financing plan' 08 has two ex-
pressed goals. One is to adequately fund the operation of each dis-
trict's basic education program and the other is to "equalize
differences in property wealth between school districts."10 9
The General Education Aid Program is divided into the Basic
General Education Formula, controlled by the state, and the Ref-
erendum Levy, determined by the local district."l0 As in previous
state formula allowances, these additional components of the gen-
eral education formula recognize factors that increase the costs of
operating an educational program, costs which would unjustly pe-
nalize particular districts if they were not appropriately compen-
sated. The factors compensated for are small size and isolation of
July 20, 1988 [hereinafter Money Matters] (unpaginated publication). Table One
can best be understood with the following glossary:
Glossary EARC. Adjusted assessed valuation, as determined by Equali-
zation Aid Review Committee. Foundation Revenue: The sum of reve-
nue from the foundation levy... plus state foundation aid associated
with each component for the foundation levy. Referendum Revenue:
General operating revenue derived from a levy approved by voter ref-
erendum. This includes referendum aid paid to equalize such levies in
taconite districts. WADM. Weighted average daily membership (some-
times called "actual pupil units"). The weights are 0.5 pupil units per
kindergarten pupil, 1.0 pupil units in grades 1-6, and 1.4 pupil units in
grades 7-12. Handicapped kindergarten and pre-kindergarten pupils
are individually weighted according to the number of hours of educa-
tional service the pupil receives.
Legislative Trends, supra note 88, at 10.
108. Minn. Stat. § 124A (1988).
109. Money Matters, supra note 107.
110. Id. The basic general education formula establishes the minimum level of
funding for school districts, with the specific formula allowance and the general ed-
ucation levy set for each year by legislation. Id.
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rural school districts,"' high levels of staff training and operating
costs,"l 2 and high concentrations of students from families receiv-
ing AFDC.11
These three additional cost factors may increase state aid but
not local levies. Although similar to previous formulas, these cate-
gories have been limited to fewer districts and have been restricted
in dollars allotted."14 (Appendix A-3 illustrates the funding
program.)
There is no precise formula for determining the minimum
level of funding; rather, it is completely left up to legislative dis-
cretion."15 Once the base level of necessary funding is determined,
the legislature establishes a minimum levy, an amount which each
district must tax its inhabitants in order to receive the state's guar-
anteed allowance. 116 For example, the 1988-89 mill levy is 35.9
mills while the basic revenue guarantee is $2,755.117 Thus, regard-
less of the revenue actually raised by an individual district through
a general property tax levy, the actual dollar amount is guaranteed
by the state, provided the district levies the required tax. For an
example of how this levy system works, see Table 2 below. The
figures in Table 2118 are based on enrollment of 1,000 pupil units,
and it charts the relative local revenue contribution to the state
aid contribution for three general property valuation rates under
the current financing system.
111. Id, The sparsity revenue provides additional revenue for small isolated
schools. The formula takes into account a school district's enrollment and the dis-
tance from a district's school to a school in another district. Id.
112. Id. The training and experience revenue provides additional money to dis-
tricts that have a high level of staff training and experience relative to the state
average. Id.
113. Id. The compensatory revenue provides additional funding for districts with
high concentrations of students from families receiving AFDC. Id.
114. High School Education, supra note 87, at 35.
115. Money Matters, supra note 107.
116. Id. A mill levy is 10 times the percentage of tax per dollar in property
value. For example, a 35.9 mill levy represents .0359 percent of each property tax
dollar required to be allocated to education in order to ensure reception of the ref-
erendum state funding. Id.
117. See id.
118. Minnesota House Ways and Means Committee, Financing Education in Min-






STATE AID AND LOCAL REVENUE CONTRIBUTIONS
Valuation
Low Average High
Adjusted Assessed Property Value $17,500,000 $35,000,000 $70,000,000
Local Property Tax Effort 35.9 mills 35.9 mills 35.9 mills
Local Revenue Contributions $628,250 $1,256,500 $2,513,000
State Aid Contributions $2,126,750 $1,498,500 $242,000
Percent State Aid 77.2% 54.4% 8.8%
Percent Local Revenue 22.8% 45.6% 91.2%
TOTAL BASIC GENERAL
EDUCATION REVENUE $2,755,000 $2,755,000 $2,755,000
The only non-state controlled revenue is the "referendum
levy," which allows districts to increase the revenue available in
their general funds with the approval of the voters in the district.
This referendum levy is raised exclusively by local property taxes
and is retained in its entirety by the local levying district. Thus,
the levy is the only portion of educational aid not levied or equal-
ized by the state. Since the primary disequalizing factors are com-
pensated for by state aid,"9 the referendum levy is necessarily the
primary source of any funding disparities among school districts.120
III. Equity of Minnesota's School Financing System
Discussion of Minnesota's school financing system begins
with an analysis of the financing system's inequity, for if there are
no inequities, then constitutional analysis is moot.12' An evalua-
tion of the equity of Minnesota's school financing system requires
a two-step process. First, the state must establish an appropriate
standard (or means) for evaluating educational opportunities. Sec-
119. Although there inevitably exists disequalizing factors other than those com-
pensated for under Minnesota's school financing plan, a thorough discussion of
those factors is beyond the scope of this article. Also, the actual degree to which
the state's formula works truly to compensate for the identical disequalizing factors
is uncertain, but similarly beyond the limits of this article.
120. Similarly, any general funding inadequacies are primarily the result of the
state providing an insufficient basic revenue per pupil.
121. While some may think that addressing the constitutional question first is
more logical, "the course of litigation [has] not followled] this route." Johnson,
supra note 9, at 337. Courts inclined to judicial restraint have not elected proce-
dural and technical methods to circumvent the constitutional issues, rather, they
have faced the issues directly. Id.
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ond, the state must evaluate the equity of the system in light of
the equalization standard chosen. This article's evaluation of the
equity of Minnesota's school financing plan will focus on its most
controversial component: the referendum levy.
A. Standard of Equalization: Goal of Fiscal Neutrality
Given the usually undefined role of schools and the illusive
goals of education, judicial standards of educational equality are
predictably muddled. In their oft-cited article, The Cost-Quality
Debate in School Finance: Do Dollars Make a Difference?,122 John
E. McDermott and Stephen P. Klein cite eight different standards
considered by courts as measures of equality of educational oppor-
tunity. These standards are: "equal expenditures per pupil";123
"dollars to needs";124 "lack of judicially manageable standards";125
"maximum variable ratio";126 "negative standards";127 "inputs";128
122. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52.
123. Id. at 417. Unlike the "one-person one-vote" principle, the "one dollar one-
scholar" measure of equality has been universally rejected. Id. The need for spe-
cial aid or "justified inequality" is best summarized by John Coones, a noted author
on school financing equity for over twenty years:
It is no virtue simply to achieve equality in facilities or in anything
else; indeed, it may be a very great vice to do so where individual need
or preferences differ. It is those needs and preferences that are impor-
tant, and equality does not always serve them; indeed, it tends to be an
arbitrary matter.
James Guthrie, Walter Garms, & Lawrence Pierce, School Finance and Education
Policy: Enhancing Educational Efficiency, Equality and Choice 2 (1988). The Min-
nesota legislature has not only conceded this point, it has created for over fifteen
years school financing systems which, to varying degrees, have recognized the need
for increased funding for various students and districts. See supra notes 98-118 and
accompanying text.
124. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at 417. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327
(D.N.D. 1968), recognized the obvious unmanageability and unacceptability of a sys-
tem creating an infinite array of excuses for disparity-most of which were in-
defensible. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at 417. A Minnesota legislative
report termed this standard an "ideal concept" and similarly identified its problem
of requiring "so many subjective judgments." See Legislative Trends, supra note
88, at 2.
125. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at 417. The McInnis court and the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia in Burrus v. Wil-
kerson, 301 F. Supp. 1237 (W.D. Va. 1968), aff'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), found ruling on
the issue of equality in school financing to be beyond judicial competence to rule on
without manageable standards of review. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at
417. Consequently, it is incumbent upon litigants to establish acceptable measures
of equality of educational opportunity, which satisfy the basic equality requirement
and are flexible enough to meet the increased need of special students and districts.
See infra notes 128-138 and accompanying text.
126. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at 417. The criticism of this measure is
that it raises serious separation of powers questions. Id. Furthermore, the subjec-
tive nature of setting ratios begs the question of objectivity. Id.
127. Id. This standard (also known as fiscal neutrality) identifies what equality
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"outputs";129 and "minimum adequacy.1 30
of educational opportunity is not. Id. at 418. The foremost example is the "fiscal
neutrality" principle. Fiscal neutrality posits expenditure disparity based on wealth
to be unlawful. Fiscal neutrality satisfies the judicial criteria for it is a manageable
standard for the courts, it maintains equality, and it is flexible enough to make al-
lowances for the special needs of individual pupils and districts. As the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota stated in support of fiscal
neutrality:
[Aibsolute uniformity of school expenditures by the districts of the
state is not required. On the contrary, the fiscal neutrality principle
not only removes discrimination by wealth but also allows free play to
local effort choice and openly permits the State to adopt one of many
optional school funding systems.
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971).
The major criticism of this standard is that it does not extend to inequities
other than wealth. Nevertheless, so long as a consensus exists on what does not
justify expenditure disparities, this standard provides a viable judicial measure.
Further, as this standard challenges what historically has been the major source of
inequality-wealth-based disparity, the plan should be given much judicial
attention.
128. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at 419. The inputs standard seeks to
measure equality by the level of educational resources available to each district. To
explain this standard, McDermott and Klein cite Justice Marshall's dissent in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), where he sug-
gested such a standard: "The question of discrimination in educational quality must
be deemed to be an objective one that looks to what the State provides its children,
not to what the children are able to do with what they receive." Id. at 419-20. Such
a standard would necessarily measure such factors as teachers' training, cost ex-
penditures, teacher-student ratios, facilities available. Id. at 420. The criticism of
this standard is that, similar to the equal expenditure measure, its rigidity fails ade-
quately to meet the needs of its special students. However, some more elaborate
input systems attempt to provide equal inputs by adjusting for unique needs of
pupils of districts and for cost and price differences. See Legislative Trends, supra
note 88, at 3. For a discussion of Minnesota's use of flexible inputs system, see
supra notes 101-103 and 115-120 and accompanying text.
129. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at 420. This standard measures equality
in terms of the students' actual academic achievement as measured by standard
tests. Id. The difficulty in this measure is the impossibility of factoring in influ-
ences other than school that affect student achievement scores. As yet unable to
monitor and weigh all of these factors, courts have preferred to leave output-based
challenges to the social sciences. Under equal protection analysis, this standard can
be deemed irrelevant, for equal protection provisions require equal treatment of
persons, not the "creation" of equal results in people. Id. at 432.
130. Id. at 423. This standard measures whether a state has successfully pro-
vided an education satisfying a level of "minimum adequacy." This is the standard
adopted by the Rodriguez court. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 92 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is the standard which ensures the
least judicial entanglement while being the most manageable, requiring nothing
more than a showing of having provided a minimally adequate education. All other
disparities and inequities are irrelevant. A chief criticism of this standard was orig-
inally voiced by Justice Marshall in his Rodriguez dissent, noting that this standard
still required the Court to set a qualitative measure to determine what is an "ade-
quate" education. 411 U.S. at 89. This, Marshall argues, the Court clearly refused
to do.
The second major criticism of this standard is its frequent application by those
who refuse to accept the relationship between cost expenditures and the quality of
education. McDermott and Klein, supra note 52 at 423.
FINANCING EDUCATION IN MINNESOTA
Of these equalization standards, McDermott and Klein advo-
cate a hybrid of the negative and input standards-a negative-in-
put. (fiscal neutrality) standard.131 This system focuses on
expenditure or input inequalities that lack rational justifications,
particularly wealth-based disparities. Such a system effectively ad-
dresses the primary ill of school financing, while giving courts the
flexibility to look also at inequities in programs, services, and facil-
ities. The relative ease of applying this standard and its numerical
objectivity allow it to be judicially manageable and legislatively
understood.
The multiplicity of approaches to and the complexity of de-
termining standards for equalization of educational opportunity
have led many courts to avoid interpreting the constitutional con-
tours of education. However, critics have argued that for the same
reason no one would accept de jure segregation as non-justiciable
because of allegations of attendant harmful side effects, courts
should not refuse this challenge due to uncertainty and timidity.' 32
The equalization standard of choice in Minnesota appears to
be a variant of the negative-input standard (fiscal neutrality).
Though undermined by Rodriguez, Van Dusartz held that "the
level of spending for a child's education may not be a function of
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole."'i 33 Despite
its lack of precedential value, the Van Dusartz court's objection to
fiscal neutrality, is still persuasive:
This is not the simple instance in which a poor man is injured
by his lack of funds. Here the poverty is that of a governmen-
tal unit that the State itself has defined and commissioned.
The heaviest burdens of this system surely fall de facto upon
those poor families residing in poor districts who cannot es-
cape to private schools, but this effect only magnifies the odi-
ousness of the explicit discrimination by the law itself against
all children living in relatively poor districts. 134
Minnesota's adoption of the fiscal neutrality standard is sup-
ported by Legislative Trends, a 1987 education report compiled by
Minnesota's Legislative Commission on Public Education, 35 which
described the fiscal neutrality standard as "perhaps the most criti-
cal component of both research and litigation on education financ-
ing equity."' 36 Legislative Trends explained that fiscal neutrality
131. McDermott & Klein, supra note 52, at 434.
132. Guthrie, Garms, & Pierce, supra note 123, at 434.
133. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1972) (explaining
the fiscal neutrality standard adopted from Serrano).
134. Id. at 876.
135. Legislative Trends, supra note 88.
136. Id. at 50.
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is an important concept in school finance due to the immense diffi-
culty (if not impossibility) in defining and measuring "quality" of
education, per pupil revenues, or expenditures.137 Fiscal neutral-
ity uses substitute measures in calculating the degree of neutrality
of a state's financing system. For this reason, the fiscal neutrality
standard has been partially adopted and cited as the goal of Minne-
sota's current basic aid-to-education program.138
There are three distinct advantages for Minnesota courts in
adopting the fiscal neutrality standard. First, fiscal neutrality does
not define or even address the question of "adequacy" of educa-
tional opportunity, but, rather, it attempts to ensure that the edu-
cational opportunity provided in a state is equally available to all
of its citizens. Thus, courts avoid entanglement in the political
quagmire of determining "adequacy."' 139 Second, fiscal neutrality
establishes a numerical and objective evaluation of equality of edu-
cational opportunity. 140 The courts thus provide parameters for
the state's obligation to educate, while maintaining sufficient def-
erence to the legislature in matters of education. Third, the adop-
tion of a standard which would eliminate all substantial funding
differences among school districts supports the acceptability of the
state's "choice" plan-a policy permitting parents to move their
children to the school of their choice. Many have criticized the
"choice" plan as likely to lead to the abandonment of poor inner-
city schools which are traditionally underfinanced. 141 Equalized fi-
nancing would cause a two-fold benefit: all parents would be able
to make their choices based on non-monetary concerns, and under-
financed schools would be given the resources to improve.
An education finance system is fiscally neutral if revenue and
tax rate differences among districts are independent of their prop-
erty wealth and reflect only differences in effort among districts to
raise education revenues.142 A positive correlation between a dis-
trict's property wealth and tax rates and its educational revenue is
a critical component of litigation on education financing equity.143
A strong correlation indicates inequity, for it reveals that property-
wealthy districts have significantly more revenue per pupil than
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 130.
140. See infra notes 142-156 and accompanying text.
141. Tifftl, supra note 28, at 48.
142. Legislative Trends, supra note 88, at 44 (citing Stephen J. Carroll, The
Search for Equity in School Financing, in Financing Education: Overcoming Ineffi-
ciency and Inequity (1982)); see also id. (adopting the fiscal neutrality standard im-
plicitly through its entire study of property tax rate relationship to school funding).
143. Id. at 50, 69-70.
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less property-wealthy districts in terms of total general revenue. 14
B. Statistical Analysis of the Equity of Minnesota's School
Financing System
1. Correlating Revenue to Property Wealth
In Legislative Trends,145 the relationship between district
revenue and property wealth was statistically correlated. While
the legislative study demonstrated recent improvements in reduc-
ing the correlation between a district's general education revenue
and its property wealth, the general revenue plus referendum rev-
enue remains "closely correlated with property wealth."x40 Thus,
while the general revenue plan is working to achieve equity, the
referendum levy is not.
Appendix A-4 represents these findings by mapping the rela-
tionship between the general revenue plus referendum revenue
per pupil and average property assessment value per pupil.4 7 Ap-
pendix A-4 illustrates the "clear positive relationship" between
revenue and property wealth.148
Though there has been vocal support for equity in school fi-
nancing for many years, Legislative Trends statistically documents
that little change has been effected. The relationship between rev-
enue and property wealth appears to be as strong as it was in 1972-
73.149 Using a commonly accepted statistical measure of finance
equity called the Gini Coefficient,150 the strength of the relation-
144. Id. at 69-70 (The property-wealth to expenditure relationship merely im-
plies inequities; no single factor or set of factors can irrefutably disclose inequity.).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 73. General revenue plus referendum revenue is merely the sum of
the guaranteed state maximum allowance per district and the referendum reve-
nues, if any, raised by the district.
147. Id. at 10. In studying this relationship, Minnesota's 435 districts were
equally divided into deciles according to each district's property wealth. Group One
combines the districts with the lowest property wealth per pupil unit (average
property valuation per pupil of $16,993). Id. at 51. Group Ten represents the dis-
tricts of the highest property wealth (average property valuation per pupil of
$74,210). Id. Groups Two through Nine represent districts with average property
wealth falling between the two extremes, with the average property wealth in-
creasing with the group number. Id.
148. Id. Group Ten, the highest wealth district, had the highest revenue per pu-
pil for each of the seven years. Further, revenue per pupil consistently increases
with the group's wealth ranking. To illustrate, Group Eight had a greater revenue
than Group Seven in all seven years, Group Five had a greater revenue than Group
Seven in all seven years, and Group Five had a greater revenue than Group Four in
six of the seven years. Id.
149. Id. at 74.
150. Id. at 55-57 ("a complex mathematical measure of the extent to which per-
pupil revenue is related to per-pupil wealth"). For a further discussion of the ac-
tual equation, see id. at 89-90.
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ship between revenue and property wealth is less than in 1983-84,
but higher than in 1978-79 and nearly equal to 1972-73.151 Addi-
tional comparisons reveal the same correlation between revenue
and property wealth.152
The correlation between revenue and property wealth contin-
ues to expand under the state's revised school financing plan. This
conclusion is shown graphically in two state-prepared tables, Ap-
pendices A-5 and A-6, illustrating the relationship between reve-
nue and property wealth under the revised school financing plan.
2. Correlating Foundation Tax Rates with Revenue
per Pupil
The next factor in determining financing equity is the rela-
tionship between tax rates and school district property wealth.153
Minnesota's overall tax rates reflect the influence of district prop-
erty wealth on the educational expenditures. Tax rates do not
vary much among the districts, but tax plus referendum tax rates
reveal a somewhat higher rate in wealthier districts than in less
property-wealthy districts.154 Total school tax rates also reflect a
disparate impact on less property-wealthy districts.155 This advan-
tage for wealthier districts is primarily attributable to the referen-
151. Id. at 74.
152. Disparity in referendum revenue per pupil ranges from a high of $273 in
Group Ten to a low of $37 in Group three. Id. at 73. Further, the average total
revenue per pupil in Group Ten is more than $400 above the state average and
more than $500 above the average for each of Groups One through Five. Id. at 74.
153. It is generally thought to be undesirable to have wide disparities in
tax rates among districts, even when such disparities reflect true dif-
ferences among taxpayers and consumers in the amounts of educa-
tional services they desire. It is even less desirable to have disparities
in tax rates that are closely correlated with school district wealth. If
low-wealth districts have unusually high tax rates, it may be due to an
education finance structure that provides too little equalization aid, so
that low-wealth districts must tax themselves excessively in order to
provide educational programs. On the other hand, if low-wealth dis-
tricts have inordinately low tax rates, it may be that such districts sim-
ply do not have access to levies to which wealthier districts have
access. The lack of access may be due to legal restrictions, because the
districts do not meet the criterion specified in law, e.g., certain
grandfathering requirements. Or the lack of access may be due to eco-
nomic, political, sociological, or other factors that effectively preclude
access to revenues, e.g., the difficulty that extremely low-wealth dis-
tricts have in passing referendum levies.
Id. at 59.
154. Id. at 67, 74.
155. Tax rates are above the state average in the four least-wealthy deciles and
below the state average in the six wealthiest deciles. Id. at 74. In fact, the rate in
Group Ten is 5.20 mills below the state average, and 10.79 mills below the rate for
Group One. Id. at 74, 76, 77, 79.
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dum levy.156
3. Particular Problems with the Referendum Levy
The referendum levy has become an integral element of
school financing in Minnesota.157 From taxes paid in 1988-89, 239
of Minnesota's 435 school districts raised over $133 million
through referendum levies. These figures are up from 1987-88,
when 226 districts raised $112 million, and 1986-87, when 217 dis-
tricts raised $95 million.158 In response to the increase in referen-
dum taxing, the Chairman of the House Education Committee's
finance division observed, "The message [school district voters are]
sending [legislators] is that funding is not adequate.... We [legis-
lators] certainly don't want inequity. If there are that many refer-
endums out there and they're passing, maybe we [legislators] need
to reconsider [funding]."159 While the number and importance of
the referendum levy has become invaluable to many Minnesota
school districts, low-wealth districts have not significantly benefit-
ted from them.'6 0
Two factors contribute to this result. First, taxpayers of most
low-wealth districts face higher tax rates than those of high prop-
erty-wealth districts. 16 1 Second, property-poor districts are reluc-
tant to further levy the overburdened taxpayers of poorer districts.
Even if a property-poor district were willing to extend its school
levy beyond those of other districts, the district would be forced to
levy at a much greater rate to garner a comparable yield.162
156. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (Table 1).
157. Id.; see also Star Tribune, Oct. 20, 1988, at 1A, col. 2.
158. Star Tribune, Oct. 20, 1988, at 1A, col. 2.
159. Id.
160. "The proportion of districts with referendum levies is over half in Groups
Five through Ten (property-wealthy districts) and over eighty percent in Groups
Nine and Ten." Legislative Trends, supra note 88, at 77-78. In Groups One through
Three (low property-wealth districts), however, only about one-quarter of the dis-
tricts have referendum levies. Id.
161. The total school tax rate, not including referenda levies, is above the state
average in Groups One through Four and below the state average in Groups Five
through Ten. Id. at 76-77. In fact, the gross total school tax rate, not including ref-
erenda levies, is 52.67 mills in Group One (the least wealthy district), a figure more
than seven mills above the state average and thirteen mills above the comparable
rate for Group Ten (the wealthiest district). Id. at 76.
162. Id. at 77. For example, the average revenue for one mill levy in Group One
is $17-less than half of the statewide average of $38 and less than one-fourth of
the average for Group Ten. Id. Conversely, the average tax rate needed to raise
$300 per pupil in referendum levy revenue is 17.7 mills for districts in Group One,




C. Adequacy of Minnesota's School Financing System
Having established the imbalance in educational expenditures
(finance inequity), the issue is whether these inequities translate
into qualitative differences in educational opportunity (program
inequity). This determination is known as the "cost-quality" rela-
tionship.163 While there is some academic disagreement about the
cost-quality relationship in regard to educational expenditures,164
courts nationwide have had little difficulty finding that dollars do
produce differences in educational opportunity.165 Minnesota's ap-
parent acceptance of this conclusion is substantiated by the legisla-
tive auditor's report High School Education. 166 The 1988 report
observed that the referendum levy was, in fact, a factor contribut-
ing to curriculum variations between Minnesota school districts.16 7
Recognition that there is a level of diminishing returns from
increased educational inputs anticipates the next question:
whether Minnesota's financial inequalities translate into "inade-
quacy" of educational opportunity for those adversely affected by
the financing scheme. The best documentation of the insufficiency
of current school financing is found in the conclusions of High
School Education.168
We question whether all students have equal access to high
school education in Minnesota. Although only a small fraction
of Minnesota students in grades 9 through 12 may be affected
by outright curriculum failure, we believe the rarity of defi-
cient programming begs important questions of fairness and
quality. In addition, equity questions are posed by (1) districts'
uneven reliance on television technology, mid-day busing, al-
ternate-year scheduling, and high school correspondence pro-
grams and (2) limited access to courses which go beyond the
miniMum. 16 9
Additionally, common sense dictates that referendum levies will
not be passed unless the majority of citizens believe current fund-
163. See generally McDermott & Klein, supra note 52.
164. The primary concern focuses on a 1966 empirical study which found no cor-
relation between increased educational expenditures, inputs (books, equipment)
and student performance on standardized tests. See generally Office of Educ., U.S.
Dept. of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966).
165. Note, supra note 82, at 569. Additionally, Gary Farland, director of Minne-
sota's Dept. of Education, Education Finance and Analysis, cites national studies
finding a strong correlation between additional educational expenditures and signif-
icant economic increases. Gary Farland, Elementary/Secondary Education and the
Minnesota Economy 3 (1989) (unpublished manuscript).
166. ADDED TO BALANCE WITH NEW FOOTNOTE 166 IN TEXT.
167. High School Education, supra note 87.
168. Farland, supra note 165, at xix. Since the sole effect of the referendum levy
is additional revenue, there is an implicit adoption of the cost-quality relationship
in the report's conclusion.
169. High School Education, supra note 87.
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ing is inadequate.170 The sheer number of passing referendum le-
vies and the increasing size of the levies substantiate the perceived
inadequacy of current funding and the need for additional
revenues.
Expenditure disparities exist between the state's school dis-
tricts. These disparities create inequities which have a significant
impact on the quality of educational opportunity in Minnesota.
Therefore, the state's allowance of the referendum levy, the pri-
mary contibutor to the disparities, makes the state a constructive
sponsor of the inequities that follow.
IV. Constitutionality of Minnesota's School Financing System
The two Minnesota constitutional provisions that protect edu-
cational interests are the education uniformity clause171 and the
equal protection guarantee.172 The education uniformity clause
provides as follows:
The stability of a republican form of government depending
mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the
legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public
schools. The legislature shall make such a provision by taxa-
tion or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient sys-
tem of public schools throughout the state (emphasis
added). 173
The equal protection guarantee under the Minnesota Constitution
prohibits the state from denying its residents the equal protection
of the laws.1 7 4 Minnesota's school financing system can be success-
fully challenged on either ground.
A. State Education Uniformity Clause Argument
Education clauses create a state duty to educate, a duty which
clearly rests at the apex of the state's function.17 5 The constitu-
tional guarantee of a "general and uniform" and "thorough and ef-
ficient" education further defines this duty. Minnesota courts
have found these guarantees to create a mandatory duty on the
state to maintain public schools.176 Minnesota courts acknowledge
that the legislature has broad authority and discretion in the field
170. Id. at 38.
171. Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1.
172. See generally Minn. Const. art. I, § 2 (rights and privileges clause); art. X
(uniformity clause); art. XII (special legislative section).
173. See supra note 170 (emphasis added).
174. See supra note 171.
175. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
176. Associated Schools of Indep. Dist. No. 63 v. School Dist. No. 83, 122 Minn.
254, 142 N.W. 325, 326-29 (1913).
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of education financing.177 This discretion, however, is limited by
the parameters of the Minnesota education clause.178  As the
Texas Supreme Court stated while considering a constitutional
challenge on similar language:
Fortunately, however, for the people, the function of the judi-
ciary in deciding constitutional questions is not one which it is
at liberty to decline ... [we] cannot, as the legislature may,
avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Con-
stitution; [we] cannot pass it by because it is doubtful; with
whatever doubt, with whatever difficulties a case may be
attended.179
Despite the imprecise terms employed, Minnesota courts must cre-
ate constitutional guidelines. Judicial refusal to define such an im-
portant constitutional question is inherently suspect, for the state
education clause arguably requires, at a minimum, clearly defined
constitutional parameters for evaluating school finance inequities.
Leaving the legislature with unbridled discretion in the area of
school financing exacerbates the disparate treatment of students
based on the wealth of their school distirct-an action which is
clearly not within the perview of the legislature.S0 It is impera-
tive for Minnesota courts to define with specificity the qualitative
standard it adopts. The cost of failing to do so has been well
documented.' 8 '
177. Board of Educ. of Minneapolis v. Houghton, 181 Minn. 576, 233 N.W. 834,
835 (1930).
178. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). ("[Jlust as the
legislature cannot abridge constitutional rights by its enactments, it cannot curtail
them through its silence.... The judicial obligation to protect the rights of individ-
uals is as old as this country.").
179. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.
1989)(quoting Morton v. Gordon, Dalam 396, 397-98 (Tex. 1941)).
180. Id. (When called upon to define imprecise terms of the constitution, "this
court must ... measure the constitutionality of the legislative actions.").
See also Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 504, 585 P.2d 71, 86
(1978). The Court concluded: "Once it is determined that judicial interpretation
and construction are required, there remains no separation of powers issue. There-
after, the matter is strictly one of judicial discretion." Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 180, 211 (1962)). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (Chief
Justice Marshall declaring the judiciary supreme in the area of constitutional inter-
pretation, declaring the legal duties thereunder, and the application thereof).
181. See Robinson v. Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), (cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1974). The court focused on the specific discrepancies (in dollar inputsper
pupil) of the then existing financing plan and stated only generally in regard to re-
vising the plan:
Indeed the state has never spelled out the content of the educational
opportunity the constitution requires. Without some such prescrip-
tion, it is even more difficult to understand how the tax burden can be
left to local initiative with any hope that state wide equality of educa-
tional opportunity will emerge.
Id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295.
As a consequence, see Robinson v. Cahill I-VII. Robinson v. Cahill VII, 70 N.J. 464,
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In creating the constitutional guidelines (qualitative stan-
dards) for evaluating legislation in this area, Minnesota courts are
neither directed by a clear expression of the framers' intent,18 2 nor
relieved of their interpretive duty by traditionally applied justifica-
tions for avoiding the issue. Minnesota courts could advance two
justifications for not creating a qualitative standard of equalization
of educational opportunity. They could either deny the "cost-qual-
ity" issue or embrace "local control" as a legitimate excuse for
Minnesota's school finance inequities. The former justification is
eliminated by the state's apparent preliminary acceptance of the
validity of the cost-quality relationship between expenditures and
educational opportunity. 18 3 Local control as a justification is also
prohibited by the inherent inconsistency in denying the cost-qual-
ity relationship, but then using that very relationship to excuse the
economic disparities created by local control. Further, the use of
local control as a justification for the financing inequities violates
the language of Minnesota's education clause, which gives the duty
to educate to the state not to local districts.
Finally, local control is contrary to the established law on
broader state-wide and national goals,184 and an anathema to the
successful implementation of the "choice" system.1 85
Unable to avoid reaching a qualitative standard, Minnesota
courts are presented with a purely interpretive question: what is
meant by "general and uniform" and "thorough and efficient?"
"Uniform," by definition and case law, implies broad egalita-
rian objectives. The definition of "uniform" is "having always the
360 A.2d 400 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill VI, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); Robin-
son v. Cahill V, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193, reprinted in corrected form in 69 N.J. 133,
351 A.2d 713 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill IV, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975); Robinson v.
Cahill III 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d
273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974); Robinson v. Cahill I, 118 N.J. Super 223,
287 A.2d 187, vacated, 119 N.J. super 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1973)), which chronicle the
New Jersey courts' difficulties in getting a reluctant legislature to adhere to the
standards it has constitutionally imposed. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 344 n.80
and accompanying text of article for an abbreviated discussion of this situation.
In contrast, see the expeditious resolution of unconstitutional school financing
in Montana following explicit judicial pronouncements of qualitative standard of
full educational equality and prohibition against reliance on disequalizing local
taxes. Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 & High School Dist. No. 1 of Lewis &
Clark County v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
182. Records from the proceedings of Minnesota's constitutional convention of
1857 reveal the delegates attempted to emulate the Massachusetts and Ohio phrase-
ology, but these records are not useful in giving content to the education clause.
The Debates and Proceedings of the Minnesota Constitutional Convention 437-38
(1857).
183. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
185. See Tifft, supra note 28, at 48.
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same form, manner, or degree not varying or variable."18 6 A con-
curring justice in Seattle School District No. 1 found that the "gen-
eral and uniform" provision of the Washington Constitution's
education clause,187 taken with the broad requirement for a "regu-
lar and dependable" source of funding, mandated equality of edu-
cational opportunity.188
Likewise, "thorough and efficient" has been broadly inter-
preted to mandate equality of educational opportunity. To para-
phrase the New Jersey Supreme Court, the term "thorough"
connotes in common meaning the concept of completeness and at-
tention to detail. It means more than simply adequate or
minimal.189
"Efficient" alone has been held to mandate equality of educa-
tional opportunity. 90 The most desirable qualitative standard is,
as discussed above in determining the standard of equalization to
employ, one based on input equality or negative inputs (fiscal
neutrality).191
To review, fiscal neutrality has the two-fold advantage of
186. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1269 (1981).
187. Wash. Const. art. IX, § 2.
188. [T]aken together, the clauses contemplate an educational system in
which, to the extent practical through statewide planning and finan-
cial support, each child is afforded an equal opportunity to learn, re-
gardless of differences in his or her family and community resources.
The system of local levy financing challenged here is an anathema to
the egalitarian promise of these provisions, violating them in both let-
ter and spirit.
Note, supra note 82, at 573 (quoting Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d
476, 547, 585 P.2d 71, 109 (1978), (Utley, J., concurring)).
189. Robinson v. Cahill IV, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193, reprinted in corrected form
in 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
190. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
191. The "minimum adequacy" standard has been popular because it does not re-
quire extensive judicial activism. See supra note 130. While attempting to avoid ju-
dicial entanglements, such an interpretation merely avoids the requisite qualitative
question of what, in fact, is an "adequate" or "minimum" or "minimally adequate"
education. Regardless, it seems unlikely that Minnesota courts will adopt such a
low qualitative standard given Minnesotans high regard for education. See supra
notes 117, 123-124 and accompanying text. It is also unlikely that Minnesota courts
will accept a financing system which cites "local control" as the justification for its
inherent inequities. An alternative standard, "maximum variable ratios," will force,
Minnesota courts to create constitutionally permissable standards of variance be-
tween districts. See supra note 126. Aware of the degree of judicial involvement
required of such flexible and ill-defined qualitative standards, Minnesota courts are
likely to feel unqualified and disinclined to do so. The arbitrary nature of each of
these standards is reason enough for Minnesota courts to look elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 645-47, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (1977); see also supra
notes 124-130 and accompanying text. Finally and conclusively, combining the
state's equal protection guarantee, whether or not when joined with the education
uniformity clause, raises education to the level of a fundamental right, and man-
dates equality of educational opportunity.
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avoiding a qualitative definition of "adequacy" and presenting a
readily understood and applied standard. The Minnesota legisla-
ture endorsed such a standard by pronouncing funding equality as
one of the two goals for its funding plan192 and partially adopting
the standard of equalization. 93 Adoption of the fiscal neutrality
standard does not negate local control; rather, fiscal neutrality
merely restricts local control to all non-monetary decisions, e.g.,
program offerings, curriculum decision, scheduling.
By adopting a fiscal neutrality standard, the Minnesota courts
can create a judicially manageable standard to review inequities in
Minnesota's school financing system. Any demonstrable inequities
would represent prima facie evidence of the system's failure to be
"general and uniform" and "thorough and efficient", prima facie
evidence of Minnesota's failure to satisfy its constitutional man-
date of educational equality.194
The current Minnesota school financing system has reached
the threshold showing of a failure to achieve fiscal neutrality.195
The significant wealth-based disparity in financing the state's con-
tinued allowance of the referendum levy statistically documents
the inequity.196 Thus, under the fiscal neutrality standard, the
current Minnesota school financing plan is unconstitutional.
B. State Equal Protection Argument Standard of Review
The appropriate level of judicial review for education in Min-
nesota depends whether education is a fundamental right. With
federal courts foreclosed from considering federal constitutional
equal protection challenges by the Supreme Court's decision in
Rodriguez,197 Minnesota courts are the sole interpretors of the ex-
tent of Minnesota's equal protection guarantee.
Minnesota courts recognize that federal guarantees of free-
dom from discriminatory legislation may not be as extensive as
those in Minnesota.198 All three cited fundamental rights analyses
192. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 122-138 and accompanying text.
194. See Robinson v. Cahill V, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193, reprinted in corrected
form in 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713, 718-719 (1975).
195. See id.; Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The
level of review which the Minnesota courts will adopt to evaluate legislative adher-
ence to this standard is unclear. The two state court decisions which found their
states' education clauses to be violated both applied a strict scrutiny review of the
funding inequities.
196. See supra notes 142-169 and accompanying text.
197. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
198. Haskell's, Inc. v. Sopsic, 313 N.W.2d 921, 921 (Minn. 1981) ("While the fed-
eral guarantees may not be as wide reaching as Minnesota's guarantees of freedom
from discriminatory legislation, the federal test is similarly stated."). The court
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support recognition of education as a fundamental right under the
Minnesota Constitution. First, the Minnesota Constitution's ex-
plicit guarantee of educational opportunity satisfies the Rodriguez
test.1 9 9 Further, Minnesota's constitution does not provide explic-
itly for what are clearly non-fundamental rights.200 This avoids
the technical difficulties encountered by other courts.
Second, the "overall importance" fundamental rights test is
also satisfied in Minnesota. From education's percentage of the
State's total expenditures201 to education's total portion of local
property taxes, 20 2 education is clearly recognized by Minnesotans
as integral to the state's functioning. Gary Farland, director of
Minnesota's Department of Education, Education Finance and
Analysis, writes: "Minnesotans are concerned with their invest-
ment in elementary and secondary education, and whether it is
sufficiently funded and productively arranged. The concern is not
only economic; education is a necessary ingredient to all facets of
life in a healthy and achieving society." 203 The importance of edu-
cation in Minnesota is further emphasized by the number of stud-
ies on reform of Minnesota's elementary and secondary education.
Since 1982, six in-depth studies were commissioned by a variety of
groups,20 4 each calling for qualitative reform in Minnesota public
education.
Third, the nexus argument for finding fundamentality was
recognized and articulated by the Van Dusartz court. The court
conceded:
[I]t is not the "importance" of an asserted interest alone which
renders [education] specifically protected[; rather, e]ducation
has a unique impact on the mind, personality, and future role
of the individual child. It is basic to the functioning of a free
society and thereby evokes special judicial solicitude. 20 5
Under state court decisions finding education to be a funda-
noted the existence of "the broader and more far reaching state constitutional guar-
antees[,]" but it was not forced to determine the reach of the state constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and due process beyond the 14th amendment of the
United States Constitution. Id.
199. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 at 33-34.
200. See generally Minn. Const. art. I, § 2 (rights and privileges clause).
201. Office of Minnesota Legislative Auditor, Trends in Educational Expendi-
tures at ix (1988) (one-third of state's budget goes to fund public education).
202. Id. (44% of local property taxes go to fund public education).
203. See Farland, supra note 165, at 2.
204. Id. at 5 (Citizens' League of Minnesota, Governor's Commission of Educa-
tion for Economic Growth, Minnesota Education Association, Center for Urban and
Regional Affairs and College of Education at University of Minnesota, the Minne-
sota Business Partnership, and the Legislative Auditor's Office).
205. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 875 (D. Minn. 1971).
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mental right, every court except one applied strict scrutiny.20 6
Strict scrutiny in Minnesota requires the defending party to meet
the onerous burden that the right infringed upon be necessary to
advance a compelling state interest.207 Given the limited defenses
to strict scrutiny analysis and the irrelevance of local control as a
defense to such wealth-based disparity,208 it is unlikely Minne-
sota's school financing system can be held constitutional. It is also
questionable whether the inherent inequities of Minnesota's school
financing system can withstand intermediate or even rational basis
scrutiny.
Finally, all supposed objections to such a constitutional pro-
nouncement as ignoring "practical realities" are baseless and irrel-
evant. No studies are available substantiating any negative
realities resulting from a constitutional finding against Minnesota's
school financing system. Such objections would presumably paral-
lel the unsupported "doomsday realities" that opponents to segre-
gation raised in Brown v. Board of Education. A retrospective
look at the impact of Brown v. Board of Education, however,
shows that these fears are merely illusory. As illustrated in
Brown v. Board of Education, constitutional mandates cannot be
subject to social pressures, for societal concerns and projected soci-
etal disruptions should be irrelevant to such decisions involving
fundamental rights.
V. Proposal
Despite its numerous revisions, Minnesota's school financing
plan still violates the state's constitutional mandate for equality of
educational opportunity. As such, it is the duty of the courts to de-
clare the current school financing plan unconstitutional. Specifi-
cally, given the Minnesota legislature's refusal to enact true
reform for equality of educational opportunity, the Minnesota
courts must intervene by striking the clearly disequalizing referen-
dum levy from the school financing plan while upholding legisla-
tive discretion with respect to the remainder of the financing
formula.209 Further, the courts should adopt fiscal neutrality as
206. See supra note 13.
207. Essling v. Markman, 335 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1983).
208. Id. at 239.
209. Johnson, supra note 9, at 371-72. Johnson advocated a middle-ground ap-
proach to judicial intervention in school financing when the ills of the financing
plan can be isolated. Thus, in a system such as Minnesota's, Johnson would propose
invalidating the education statute only to the "extent that it includes provisions
that are clearly disequalizing while upholding the legislative discretion with respect
to the remainder of the funding formula." Id. at 372.
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the standard to be used to evaluate the equity and constitutionality
of subsequent school funding plans.
Conclusion
The challenge presented is to openly and objectively assess
the equity and constitutionality of Minnesota's school financing
plan. Such an analysis points to a system of financing-a referen-
dum levy-which systematically produces significant disparities in
educational opportunity based on school district property-wealth.
Minnesota courts should strike the referendum levy and its inequi-
table effects from the Minnesota school financing plan and force
the legislature to restructure the plan. Only then will Minnesota
begin to truly challenge the root of its pervasive inequality of edu-
cational opportunity: wealth-based disparity.
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APPENDIX
STATE SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEMS UPHELD IN JUDICIAL
ACTIONS
Original State Education Equal Protection
State Case Name Clause Test
Pennsylvania Danson v. "The General Assem- Minimal
Casey (1979) bly shall provide for standard
the maintenance of a
thorough and effi-
cient system of pub-
lic education to serve
the needs of the
Commonwealth."*
Ohio Board of "The General Assem- Minimal
Education bly shall make such standard
v. Walter provisions, by taxa-
(1979) tion or otherwise, as,
with the income aris-
ing from the school
trust fund, will se-




Georgia Thomas v. "The provision of an Minimal
McDaniels adequate education standard
(1981) for the citizens shall
be a primary obliga-
tion of the State of
Georgia, the expense
of which shall be pro-
vided by taxation."*
Colorado Lujan v. "The General Assem- Minimal
State Board bly shall as soon as standard
of practicable, provide
Education for the establishment
(1982) and maintenance of a
thorough and uni-
form system of free
public schools
throughout the state
New York Board of "The legislature shall Minimal
Education provide the mainte- standard
v. Nyquist nance and support of
(1982) a system of free com-
mon schools wherein
all the children of
the state may be
educated."
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Original State Education Equal Protection
State Case Name Clause Test
Maryland Hornbeck v. "The General Assem- Minimal
Somerset bly, at its First Ses- standard
County sion after the adop-
Board of tion of this Constitu-
Education tion, shall by Law es-
(1983) tablish throughout







Oklahoma Fair School "Provisions should be Minimal
Finance made for the estab- standard
County of lishment and mainte-
Oklahoma nance of a system of
v. State public schools, which




and maintain a sys-
tem of free public
schools wherein all
the children of the
State may be
educated."*
South Carolina Richland "shall provide for the Minimal
County v. maintenance and standard
Campbell support of a system
(1988) of free public schools
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STATE SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEMS UPHELD IN JUDICIAL
ACTIONS
Original State Education Equal Protection
State Case Name Clause Test
New Jersey Robinson v. "The legislature shall Strict
Cahill provide for the main- scrutiny
(1973) tenance and support
of a thorough and ef-
ficient system of free
public schools . ... "*
Kansas Knowles v. "The legislature shall Strict
State Board provide for intellec- scrutiny
of tual, educational, vo-
Education cational, and scientif-




Wisconsin Buse v. "The legislature shall Strict
Smith provide by law for scrutiny
(1976) the establishment of
district schools,
which shall be as
nearly uniform as
practicable; and such
schools shall be free
and without charge
for tuition to all chil-
dren between the
ages of four and
twenty years . ... "
California Serrano v. "The legislature shall Strict
Priest provide for a system scrutiny
(1976) of common schools
by which a free
school shall be kept
up and supported in
each district at least
six months in every
year .... "
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Original State Education Equal Protection
State Case Name Clause Test
Arkansas Dupre v. "Intelligence and vir- Rational
Alma tue being the safe- relationship
School guards of liberty and
District No. the bulwark of a free
30 (1983) and good govern-
ment, the State shall
ever maintain a gen-
eral, suitable and ef-
ficient system of free
schools and shall
adopt a "suitable
means to secure to




of this amendment is







public funds for the
education of persons
over twenty-one (21)
years of age and
under six (6) years of
age, as may be pro-
vided by law and no
other interpretation
shall be given to it."*
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maintenance of an ef-
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"All free men, when
they form a social
compact, have equal
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"It is the policy of
the State of Texas
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state responsibility
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and efficient system
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through state reve-
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each student enrolled
in the public school
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her educational
needs and that are
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